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I. Introduction
It has been recognized in the endogenous growth literature that informational
externalities or spillovers among enterprises are an important source of sus-
tained economic growth.1 The potential importance of information spillovers
has also been recognized by economic geography and location theory, be-
ginning with the seminal work by Alfred Marshall and followed by a large
number of theoretical and empirical studies that attempt to explain the ad-
vantages of large cities and industrial clusters.2 In the literature on economic
development, too, since Joseph A. Schumpeter, the role of spillovers or im-
itations has been widely understood as a critical process by which new ideas
are spread from innovators to followers.3
Despite such widely shared recognition and interests, solid micro-level
empirical studies have seldom attempted to explore the evolutionary process
of innovations and imitations in the course of industrial development.4 In fact,
researchers have rarely asked even the simple questions of who the imitators
are, how the imitations take place, and how effective these imitations have
been. More important, they have generally failed to assess the importance of
imitations for output expansion and productivity growth in the process of
industrial development. This matter may be particularly important when con-
sidering the economic growth of “high-performing” East Asian economies,
which is accounted for mostly by rapid capital accumulation but little by
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technological progress.5 In these economies, where enterprises have prolif-
erated in number in the course of rapid industrial development, information
spillovers from incumbents to new enterprises have no doubt taken place.
While information spillovers from the leading enterprises to other existing
enterprises will improve the average productivity of an industry, those from
incumbents to new entrants may lower it if the latter are less productive. Thus,
the extent to which the entry of new enterprises has contributed to productivity
growth as well as output growth in East Asia needs to be examined carefully.
Using data from individual enterprises collected by our own surveys and
obtained from export statistics, this study attempts to analyze the changing
roles of imitations, as well as innovations, in the development process of the
machine tool industry in Taiwan. As latecomers to the machine tool industry,
Taiwanese manufacturers have relied heavily on technologies developed in
other countries, particularly Japan and the United States. Yet the international
transfer of new technology requires substantive domestic efforts to assimilate
and adapt the new technologies to local conditions through trial and error.6
Pioneers who made risky attempts to introduce the new technologies and
production methods may be termed “innovators.” Thus, not only the start of
machine tool production during the 1940s and 1950s but also the introduction
of numerically controlled (NC) machine production since the late 1970s and
the adoption of a mass production system based heavily on subcontracting
since the early 1980s can be regarded as “innovations” that have had a per-
vasive impact on the growth and structure of the machine tool industry in
Taiwan.
From published secondary data, it appears that productivity growth in this
industry was stagnant in the early stage of its development when the industrial
output was growing most rapidly. Based on our own enterprise survey, we
contend that there was an active entry of a swarm of low-productivity enterprises
at this stage, which lowered the productivity growth of the industry as a whole.
In later stages, when such entry decreased, however, imitations among the
existing enterprises contributed positively to productivity growth. In this article,
we analyze the changing roles of imitations by identifying the characteristics
of the imitators and innovators and by describing the changing ways in which
innovations took place over time.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we
identify three major innovations in the history of the machine tool industry
in Taiwan. In Section III, using a simple two-period model, we examine the
pattern of productivity growth and demonstrate the possibility of output growth
without significant productivity growth. In Section IV, we classify sample
enterprises into four groups, namely, pioneers, followers, new pioneers, and
new followers, and we describe the performances of these groups in terms of
the average value of production and export, NC ratio, and the value of products
per unit of weight as a quality indicator. In order to test several hypotheses
regarding heterogeneity among these groups in productivity and the ability
to imitate, in Section V, we estimate a series of reduced-form functions ex-
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plaining the values of the production and export of the sample enterprises as
well as other performance indicators. The conclusions and policy implications
of this study are discussed in Section VI.
II. Innovations and Growth in the Machine Tool Industry
In the half-century long history of machine tool production in Taiwan, there
have been three watersheds that have altered the manner of competition among
manufacturers.7 These are (1) the beginning of the production of conventional
machine tools in the late 1940s, (2) the initiation of the production of NC
machines in the latter half of the 1970s, and (3) the introduction of mass
production of highly standardized machine tools in the early 1980s. The pur-
pose of this section is to review briefly the development of these innovations.
A. Initiation of Production
The attempt to produce conventional machine tools in Taiwan was started in
the late 1940s by mechanical engineers and blue-collar workers in traditional
ironworks and other machinery industries. Such enterprises of this early period
may be regarded as “early innovators” or “pioneers,” as they struggled to
manufacture new products for more than a decade in the underdeveloped
economic conditions of the late 1940s to the early 1960s. The success of these
enterprises in manufacturing marketable machines during this period made
them the leading machine tool enterprises during subsequent periods, and
some of them were still among the largest and most prosperous enterprises
in the late 1990s.
The early development of the machine tool industry was constrained by
stagnant domestic demand. Although a gradual expansion of exports under
the export-oriented industrialization policy scheme after the 1960s promoted
the growth of the Taiwanese economy, increased production of conventional
machine tools had to wait until the mid-1970s when a swarm of new enterprises
entered the industry to exploit the newly emerging business opportunities.
Many of these enterprises were spin-offs from the pioneering enterprises and
produced accurate copies of the originals.8 Thus, these companies may le-
gitimately be called “followers.”
Such an active entry of followers in the late 1970s and the early 1980s
probably had a significant bearing on the development of interfirm division
and specialization of labor, as envisaged in the classical article by George J.
Stigler.9 Based on her field studies, conducted in 1974 and 1981, Alice H.
Amsden observed that not only the assembly but also the production of the
parts were carried out internally by machine tool enterprises in 1974; however,
the transaction of parts and intermediate products between assemblers and
part suppliers become dramatically active by 1981.10 Interfirm division and
specialization of labor was particularly developed in the area around Taichung
city, where more than half of the Taiwanese machine tool enterprises are
clustered. As the literature on economic geography suggests, even new en-
terprises with insufficient technical expertise and funds for initial investments
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Fig. 1.—Changes in the real value of production and NC ratio. Sources: For
value of production, Japan Machine Tool Builder’s Association, Kousaku Kikai Tokei
Yoran (Machine tool statistical data book) (Tokyo: Japan Machine Tool Builder’s
Association, various years), data originally from the Taiwan Association of Machinery
Industry; for NC ratios, 1981–94, Taiwan Association of Machinery Industry, Jixie
Gongye 50 Nianshi (Fifty years of the machine industry) (Taipei: Taiwan Association
of Machinery Industry, 1995), and for 1995–99, calculations by authors based on the
production data from Taiwan Association of Machinery Industry, available at http://
www.tami.org/statistics/chart2.html, Taipei. The value of production is deflated by the
wholesale price index of machinery and equipment, as reported by Council for Eco-
nomic Planning and Development, Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book
(Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, various years).
can enter an industry by taking advantage of agglomeration economies arising
from favorable access to technology information, parts and components, and
skilled labor in industrial clusters.11 The emergence of an industrial cluster
allows new entrants to grow in small steps by taking small and calculable
risks, and their active entry, in turn, reinforces agglomeration economies.12
Figure 1 shows the trend of the real value of machine tool production
since 1969, expressed in semi-log form, and the share of NC machines in the
total production value of machine tools since 1981. From the figure, we can
observe the accelerated growth of production in the latter half of the 1970s.
On the supply side, this quantitative growth is attributable to the active entry
of followers. On the demand side, the market opportunities for Taiwanese
firms improved in this period as European and Japanese manufacturers shifted
from the production of conventional machine tools to that of NC machines.
This content downloaded from 210.137.153.113 on January 07, 2016 23:22:49 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Tetsushi Sonobe, Momoko Kawakami, and Keijiro Otsuka 107
B. Production of NC Machines
While the entry of followers was increasing in the late 1970s, early innovators
were struggling to produce NC machines. The basic technology for producing
NC machines was not totally unknown to them by the mid-1970s since these
enterprises had used NC machines imported from Japan. At that time, Japanese
manufacturers had already profited from the massive fabrication of NC lathes
and machining centers.13 According to our own interviews, however, the early
production of NC machines in Taiwan from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s
entailed a lot of technical difficulties because of the paucity of engineers adept
at the interface between mechanical and electrical systems.
The first NC lathe and the first machining center were produced by Yang
Iron in 1974 and 1979, respectively, whereas the first NC milling machine
was produced by Yoeng-chin in 1979. A large Japanese manufacturer of NC
controllers assisted local machine tool producers to solve the technical dif-
ficulties in the integration of mechanical and electrical technologies. The quest
for NC machines resulted in the remarkable increase in the share of NC
machines in the total value of production from 7% in 1983 to 28% in 1990
(see fig. 1).
C. Mass Production of Standardized Products
The opportunity to profit from NC machine production attracted a new type
of enterprise that entered the industry around 1980 with the intention and
ability to produce NC machines, as well as milling machines, in the beginning.
These new entrants showed ingenuity in developing a new mass production
system of standardized NC machines and utilizing specialized subcontractors
effectively, while they themselves specialized in designing, assembling, and
marketing. With this new system, these “new pioneers” succeeded in reducing
the machine prices drastically without significantly reducing the quality of
products. They were particularly successful in the production of machining
centers, which could be more easily standardized than the NC lathe.14 Ten
years after they were founded, the pioneers had grown into the two largest
enterprises in the industry.
This new innovation was no less important than the beginning of the
production of NC machines, and it has triggered widespread imitation since
the late 1980s. First, many spin-offs from the two new pioneers founded new
enterprises in the 1990s to become “new followers.” Second, the early pio-
neers, who had accumulated technological and management capacities over
time, also tried to reduce the prices of NC machines in the 1990s by adopting
a mass production system based on subcontracting. They possessed, however,
a comparative advantage in higher-quality conventional machines, so they
continued to produce these in addition to standardized machining centers. An
important observation from figure 1 is that output increased rapidly in the
mid-1990s when the abolition of the Voluntary Restriction Arrangement on
exports to the United States implemented during the period 1987–93 led to
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TABLE 1
Changes in the Number of Enterprises, Real Value Added, and TFP Index, 1954–96
Number of Firms
Real Value Added
(1986p 100)
TFP Index
(1986p 100)
Level:
1954 19 .1 N.A.
1961 38 .9 63.2
1966 161 4.8 88.3
1986 787 100 100
1991 1,915 230.9 116.6
1996 2,374 352.0 141.2
Annual growth rate (%):
1961–86 12.1 18.8 1.7
1966–86 7.9 15.1 .6
1986–91 17.8 16.7 3.1
1991–96 4.3 8.4 3.8
Sources.—Data are from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Ex-
ecutive Yuan, Report on Industrial and Commercial Census (Taipei: Directorate-General of
Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuan, various years). The deflator is the wholesale
price index of machinery and equipment reported by the Council for Economic Planning and
Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and De-
velopment, various years).
Note.—N.A. p not available.
active imitation, even though the growth rate declined from 1997 because of
the outbreak of the Asian economic crisis.
III. A Simple Accounting Model and Hypotheses
In this section, we first outline the pattern of productivity growth of the
machine tool industry as a whole, and, then, using a simple accounting equa-
tion, we link it with the history of innovations and imitations described in
the previous section.
Table 1 shows changes in the number of machine tool enterprises, real
value added, and the total factor productivity (TFP) index calculated using
the data from the Industrial and Commercial Census of Taiwan (various years).
Unfortunately, the data for the industry in the 1970s and the early 1980s are
not available since machine tool enterprises were not distinguished from wood
machinery enterprises in the censuses conducted in 1971, 1976, and 1981. It
is interesting that the number of enterprises, which includes suppliers of parts
and components, continued to increase even in the 1990s, that is, over 4
decades after the birth of the industry.15 Presumably, this is because of the
continuous growth of the industry and the spread of mass production that
relied on the division and specialization of labor among a large number of
relatively small enterprises.
Because of the sheer paucity of data, we must admit that the calculation
of the levels as well as the growth rates of TFP is crude.16 Nonetheless, it is
worth noting that TFP growth was negligible during the period from 1966 to
1986 as compared with the spectacular growth of real value added. The pro-
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ductivity growth rate during this period may be biased downward, however,
because the industry was booming in 1966. The average annual rate of pro-
ductivity growth from 1961 to 1986, however, is as low as 1.7%, which
accounts for a mere 14% of the growth rate of real value added.
To conceptualize the effects of innovations and imitations on productivity
growth, consider a two-period model in which new enterprises enter the in-
dustry with the average TFP level of AN and capture the market share of V
in the second period. Incumbents’ average TFP level in the second period is
denoted by AI and that in the first period by AI0. Since the TFP level of the
industry as a whole in the second period ( ) is written as¯A
¯Ap (1 V)A  VA , (1)I N
its change is given by
¯A A p (1 V)A  VA  AI0 I N I0
p (1 V)(A  A ) V(A  A ). (2)I I0 N I0
Thus, the average productivity growth of the industry is a weighted average
of the productivity growth of the incumbent group and the difference between
the new entrants’ productivity level and the incumbents’ initial productivity
level.17
This simple decomposition formula implies that overall productivity can
decline if entrants are relatively inefficient (i.e., ), if their entry isA ! AN I0
sizable (i.e., large V), and if productivity improvements by incumbents are
small (i.e., small ( )). We conjecture that most of these conditions wereA  AI I0
valid in the machine tool industry in the 1970s, when the incumbents were
pioneers and the entrants were followers. The entry of followers was sizable
in the late 1970s, as noted by Amsden.18 If the followers were less efficient
than the pioneers because of imperfect imitation, then their entry could stag-
nate overall productivity growth. The fact that so many enterprises entered
suggests, however, that followers successfully imitated the innovator’s tech-
nologies and shared the innovators’ original profits. The erosion of profit for
an incumbent enterprise that lost a former employee associated with a spin-
off and new entry would not have been large because all the enterprises sell
most of their products to large international markets.
According to Martin N. Bailey et al., new entrants tend to be less efficient,
although some are highly productive; diversity among enterprises in their
productivities is quite large and persistent.19 Firms with low productivity can
survive in those industries because returns to scale at the firm level are not
large and are decreasing beyond the relatively small size ranges. Diseconomies
of scale can set in easily in machine tool production because the production
process is highly labor intensive and often unstandardized and the monitoring
of workers is costly. Thus, producers have small-sized operations, and these
tend to remain small. Since we do not have the relevant enterprise-level data
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for the late 1970s, we cannot directly examine if these arguments apply to
the followers in the machine tool industry in Taiwan. Instead, using the avail-
able data for the 1990s while assuming that the efficiency difference persists
over the extended periods, we propose to test whether the pioneers are man-
agerially and technologically more efficient than the followers. Specifically,
we postulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The pioneers are larger in the size of operation and
faster in the adoption of new technologies than the followers, and the quality
of the pioneers’ products is higher than that of the followers because of the
superior managerial and technical abilities of the former over the latter.
Throughout the 1980s, the pioneers increased the production of NC ma-
chines, and in the latter half of the decade, the followers began imitating NC
machine production. Thus, these two groups of incumbents would have made
productivity gains, and, hence, the first term in the decomposition equation
(2) would be positive in this period. Entrants in the 1980s also include the
new pioneers who entered with the intention and ability to produce NC ma-
chines. According to our interviews with the top managers of 30 machine
tool enterprises, the new pioneers were quite efficient in machine tool pro-
duction from the beginning. Thus, it is uncertain a priori whether or not the
average productivity of entrants was higher than that of incumbents.20 How-
ever, in view of the relatively high average rate of TFP growth in the late
1980s (shown in table 1), the relative productivity of the entrants (or the
second term in [2]) would not have been very low. More specifically, we
hypothesize the following relationships:
Hypothesis 2. The new pioneers are larger in size of operation and
faster in adoption of new technologies than the followers because of the
superior managerial and technical abilities of the former as compared with
the latter.
In the 1990s, the early pioneers became imitators of the mass production
of cheap and standardized NC machines. In addition, the old followers, those
who had entered in the 1970s and the 1980s, followed suit. These active
imitations by incumbents must have contributed to the fast productivity growth
observed during the period 1991–96, in contrast to the slowdown of the growth
of real value added (see table 1). Turning to the effect of productivity difference
between incumbents as a whole (i.e., the sum of pioneers, old followers, and
new pioneers) and new entrants, it is again ambiguous whether the second
term in equation (2) is negative or positive because the new followers, who
were spin-offs from the new pioneers, might have been more efficient than
the old followers. Similar to hypothesis 1, however, the following hypothesis
seems reasonable:
Hypothesis 3. The new followers are smaller than the new pioneers
in size of operation, and the quality of the products of the former tends to be
lower than that of the latter because of imperfect spillover effects.
Since we presume that the managerial and technical abilities of both
earlier and new followers tend to be lower than those of the original pioneers,
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we expect that the imitation by the original pioneers tends to be more effective
than the others. This argument can be summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 4. The original pioneers are the most effective imitators
in the 1990s.
IV. Data Source and Grouped Enterprise Performance
A. Data Source
We conducted both informal and formal surveys in the cluster of machine
tool manufacturers in the Taichung prefecture and Taichung city as well as
the surrounding areas, including Chang-hua and Nantou prefectures, in the
period 1999–2000. We visited 30 enterprises and conducted informal inter-
views to identify the major characteristics of this industry, the nature of
historical development, and the manner of competition through innovations
and imitations among enterprises. Based on such informal surveys, we pre-
pared our own questionnaire and delivered it to 60 randomly selected machine
tool enterprises. By repeated visits to those enterprises, we succeeded in col-
lecting questionnaire forms from 49 enterprises. To our knowledge, this re-
sponse rate was unusually high in Taiwan. We had to omit two enterprises
from the analysis because their products are either for household use or special
metal cutting purposes and, hence, are significantly different from those of
other sample enterprises.21
While the sample enterprises provided answers to qualitative questions
about the characteristics of managers at the time of founding and at present,
many of them did not supply information regarding the cost of production,
the importance of subcontracting, the prices of their products, and the relative
proportion of conventional and NC machines. Furthermore, some enterprises
did not even provide the data on the value of production.
Thus, we decided to rely on official export data by individual enterprises
for the value of export as a proxy for the size of enterprise, the NC machine
ratio, and the product prices. A desirable feature of this data set is that the
value and quantity of exports are reported by type of machine tools. Using
this information, we computed the unit price of each type of machine per
kilogram, which is considered an appropriate measure of the quality of ma-
chine tools.22 The export data, however, are available only for 43 enterprises
for 10 years from 1990 to 1999. In the statistical analyses below, we use the
value of export, the NC ratio (the ratio of the value of exported NC machines
to the total export value), and the unit prices of the products of these enter-
prises, in addition to the survey data of production. Figure 2 illustrates that
the total value of machine tool exports from Taiwan moved in parallel with
the total value of those moved by our 43 sample enterprises, suggesting that
our sample selection was not greatly biased.
B. Characteristics of Sample Enterprises by Group
According to our classification, there are seven pioneer enterprises, 24 fol-
lowers, two new pioneers, and 10 new followers, as shown in table 2. Pioneers
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Fig. 2.—Changes in real value of machine tool export by the sample enterprises
and by all enterprises in Taiwan. Sources: Data are from Statistical Department, Di-
rectorate General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, the Republic of China, Monthly
Statistics of Exports, the Republic of China, Taiwan District (Taipei: Statistical De-
partment, Directorate General of Customs, Ministry of Finance, the Republic of China,
various years). Value of exports is deflated by the export price index of machinery
and equipment, reported by the Council for Economic Planning and Development,
Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council for Economic Plan-
ning and Development, Republic of China, various years).
are defined as those enterprises that were founded before 1969, and four out
of the eight responding companies were founded by former machinists who
had engaged in the production of some types of traditional machines earlier
but not in the production of machine tools. On average, the pioneers were
founded in 1957. Due partly to limited domestic demand, these pioneers started
machine tool production on average 10 years after their foundings. The foun-
ders of the new pioneers had worked for other machine tool enterprises earlier
and started the production of NC machines as early as the original pioneers,
even though the latter were established more than 22 years earlier than the
former. In contrast, the followers lagged behind in the initiation of NC machine
production. The new followers, like the new pioneers, initiated NC machine
production shortly after their founding.
The educational backgrounds of the founders vary considerably among
the four groups. Many of the founders of the old pioneers were primary school
graduates, whereas those of the new pioneers completed even graduate school.
It is also clear that the founders of the early followers are more educated than
those of the pioneers but less educated than those of the new followers. Over
time, the average educational backgrounds of the founders rose, partly as a
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TABLE 2
Characteristics of Sample Enterprises at the Time of Their Founding by Enterprise Group
Pioneers Followers New Pioneers New Followers
Number of enterprises in enterprise group 7 24 2 10
Time of major events:
Year of founding for enterprise (enterprise group range) 1943–68 1966–89 1979–80 1990–97
Year of founding (enterprise group mean) 1957.1 1979.3 1979.5 1994.1
Year of initiation of NC machine production (enterprise group mean) 1980.6 1990.5 1980.5 1995.1
Years before MT production (enterprise group mean)* 12.6 .7 0 0
Previous occupations of founders (%):
Machine tool enterprises 0 59 100 90
Other machinery enterprises 88 13 0 10
Educational background of founders (%):
Primary school 71 13 0 0
Junior high school 0 12 0 0
High school (including college of technology) 29 54 0 60
University or graduate school 0 21 100 40
Relationship to founding partners (%):†
Kinship 80 67 0 0
Friends 40 50 100 56
Acquaintance though business 0 33 50 67
Number of parts suppliers in the first full year of MT production (mean) 19.0 29.6 40.5 38.7
Source.—Data are from our own survey.
* The number of years when enterprises were manufacturing parts and machines other than machine tools. Years when enterprises were engaged solely in
trading businesses are excluded.
† Percentages of enterprises that had founding partners with the specified relationships.
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TABLE 3
Characteristics of Top Executive as of 1999 by Enterprise Group
Pioneers Followers New Pioneers New Followers
Relationship to founder:
The person himself .29 .75 1.00 .90
Kinship .43 .17 .00 .00
Former employee .00 .04 .00 .00
Outsider .28 .04 .00 .10
Years of top management 16.1 13.8 18.0 5.3
Previous occupations:
Machine tool
enterprises .57 .63 1.00 .90
Other machinery
enterprises .13 .09 .00 .10
Educational background:
Primary school .43 .08 .00 .00
Junior high school .15 .09 .00 .00
Senior high or special
high school .14 .58 .00 .60
University or graduate
school .28 .25 1.00 .40
Source.—Data are from our own survey.
result of the overall progress in education in postwar Taiwan, but this may
also reflect the increasing importance of formal schooling in the management
of enterprises in the later stages of the development of the machine tool
industry.
As with other industries in Taiwan, machine tool enterprises are usually
established by shared investments of a small group of founding partners,
consisting usually of fewer than five people. As shown in table 2, kinship
ties played an important role in forming the founding groups in earlier years,
whereas it has now become common to raise funds from friends and ac-
quaintances through business over time. Although we failed to obtain accurate
information on the importance of subcontracting, the data on the number of
parts suppliers in the first full year of machine tool production, shown in the
last row of table 2, are informative. Reflecting the high rate of internal pro-
duction, the pioneers purchased parts only from 19 part suppliers, but the
early followers transacted with nearly 30 part suppliers, and both new pioneers
and new followers did so with about 40 part suppliers. This is consistent with
the results of our interviews with experienced managers, which indicated that
the dependence on purchased parts has increased over time, particularly since
the establishment of the mass production system in the 1980s.
As can be seen in table 3, the major characteristics of top executives as
of 1999 were substantially different among the four groups. Five out of the
seven pioneering enterprises had changed top executives, while most of the
top executives among other enterprises were the founders themselves. As we
will see later, the continued leadership by the aged founders with relatively
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TABLE 4
Export Performance by Enterprise Group in 1990 and 1999
Pioneers Followers
New
Pioneers
New
Followers
Real value of exports (million NT$):
1990 369.5 42.4 786.3 N.A.
1999 423.4 114.4 811.9 124.7
NC ratio:
1990 .51 .21 .84 N.A.
1999 .59 .34 .92 .83
Real unit price of machining center
(NT$):
1990 326.3 299.5 253.0 N.A.
1999 245.5 234.0 242.7 233.0
Real unit price of NC lathe (NT$):
1990 419.6 329.0 302.2 N.A.
1999 311.7 358.8 242.4 N.A.
Real unit price of conventional
machine (NT$):
1990 172.8 154.0 125.1 N.A.
1999 235.4 196.4 200.7 188.6
Source.—Data are unpublished official statistics on exports of the Taiwanese government.
Note.—N.A. p not available.
TABLE 5
Real Value of Production by Enterprise Group
Year (Number of
Observations) Pioneers Followers New Pioneers New Followers
1991 ( )Np 25 594.9 93.4 1,321.4 N.A.
1995 ( )Np 28 1,321.4 161.1 1,972.0 127.3
1998 ( )Np 41 1,067.7 198.2 1,519.4 144.4
Source.—Data are from our own survey.
Note.—N.A. p not available.
low educational backgrounds led to their adherence to the fabrication of low-
and middle-grade conventional machines.
C. Performance of Sample Enterprises by Group
Table 4 shows the export performances by enterprise group in terms of the
real value of exports per enterprise, NC ratio, and real unit price of machining
center, NC lathe, and conventional machines in 1990 and 1999.23 As can be
ascertained from this table, the new pioneers by far exceeded the other groups
in terms of both average export value per enterprise and NC ratio. It is also
interesting to observe that, in 1999, the early followers recorded a smaller
average export value and a lower NC ratio than even the new followers. The
dominance of the new pioneers is also confirmed from table 5, which reports
the real value of production from the available survey data. It is noteworthy
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that, in terms of the growth rate of the real value of production, the two types
of imitators (i.e., the pioneers and the followers) outperformed the new pi-
oneers. This seems to confirm that imitation leads to the rapid growth of
production.
Since the new followers had smaller values of production than the early
followers but larger value of exports (see tables 4 and 5), it follows that export
ratios were higher for the new followers. This is indicative of the poor per-
formance of the old followers, who specialized in production primarily for
saturated domestic markets as compared with huge overseas markets. The NC
ratio is also lower for the followers than for the new pioneers and the new
followers.
As for changes in unit prices, shown in table 4, we observe decreasing
trends for machining centers and NC lathes, whereas the average price of
conventional machines rose substantially. Apparently, Taiwanese machine tool
exporters shifted to high-quality conventional machines in response to the
rising wages in the island and the growing demand for upgraded products by
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, whereas they
successively cut the prices of NC machines to penetrate into the middle-tier
foreign markets. Of special interest is the fact that the unit prices of NC lathes
and machining centers converged to the low level set by the new pioneers
by 1990 as a result of the response of other enterprises, especially the original
pioneers. It is also interesting to observe that the followers produced relatively
cheap and low-quality conventional machines.
Figure 3 shows the changes in export value of the representative products
by enterprise group for 1990–99. It is apparent that machining centers are the
most rapidly growing product, the export of which has been dominated by
the original and the new pioneers, as can be seen from figure 3A. According
to figure 3B, these two groups have also been fairly strong at the export of
NC lathes. The superior performance of the new pioneers is all the more
outstanding as this group consists of only two enterprises. The early followers
have specialized in conventional machines as can be seen from figure 3C.
In sum, the export performances of the four groups were substantially
different in the 1990s. The old pioneers successfully responded to the price
war triggered by the new pioneers, demonstrating their strong capability of
imitating efficient rivals. In contrast, the old followers did not grow well in
the 1990s, mainly due to the failure in shifting to the NC machines, nor did
they successfully shift to the high-end conventional machine exports. The new
pioneers had large shares in the export of two of the most important NC
machines. The new followers entered the industry only after 1990, but they
surpassed the old followers by imitating the strategy of the new pioneers but
concentrating on lower-grade machining centers.
V. Determinants of Enterprise Performance
In this section, in order to test the hypotheses advanced in Section III, we
estimate reduced-form regression equations for the size of enterprise operation,
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Fig. 3.—Changes in export values by product type by firm group, 1990–99. A,
machining centers. B, NC lathes. C, conventional machines.
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NC ratio, and unit prices of machine tools. Assuming that the relative sizes
of enterprise operation reflect differences in production costs and productivity
levels, we use two dependent variables as proxies for operation size: the real
value of production and the real value of export. The ratio of NC machine
exports to total export value is used as a proxy for the ability to develop and
assimilate new technology. Unit prices of conventional machines and ma-
chining centers per kilogram are considered to reflect both the quality and
the production costs of these products.24
These regression equations have the same set of independent variables.
Included are three dummy variables identifying the enterprise group to which
an enterprise belongs, two other time-invariant variables (i.e., the type of
founder and the first year of machine tool production), and several time-variant
variables (i.e., the current top manager’s schooling, relation of current top
manager with founder, and length of service as a top manager).25 In addition,
our specification allows for unobservable enterprise-specific effects and time
effects.
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of the operation size func-
tions. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the logarithm of the
real value of production, while that in the latter two columns is the logarithm
of real export value. In column 1 of table 6, which reports the random-effects
estimates, both the follower dummy and the new follower dummy have neg-
ative and highly significant effects, indicating that the followers and the new
followers are significantly smaller than the default group of the original pi-
oneers. The new pioneers are as large as the original pioneers, controlling for
other factors. Although the test statistics are not shown in the table, the new
pioneers are significantly larger than both the early and new followers.
The spin-off dummy is equal to unity if the founder of the enterprise
was a spin-off from a machine tool enterprise, and zero otherwise. For the
new pioneers, however, the spin-off dummy is equal to zero, even though
their founders were spin-offs.26 Spin-offs have slightly smaller firm sizes than
other followers, but the differences are insignificant. The first year of machine
tool production does not have a significant effect on the real value of pro-
duction. Although the effects of the five time-invariant variables cannot be
estimated separately in the case of the fixed-effects estimation, they can be
viewed as parts of the enterprise specific effects, which can be obtained as
the residual. In column 2, the group-wise averages of the estimated enterprise-
specific effects are reported in the last four rows. Consistent with the estimated
effects of the group dummies shown in column 1, the new pioneer group has
the largest average magnitude of the fixed effects, followed by the early
pioneer group, and then by the early follower group. According to the result
of the Hausman’s specification test, reported in column 1, the random-effect
estimates are consistent.
The higher education of the current top manager tends to have positive
but statistically insignificant effects on the size of the enterprise operation.
The outsider dummy, which represents the kinship discontinuity in leadership,
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has an insignificant effect on the size of operation. Finally, the effect of the
years of top management is positive in both columns and significant in column
1, suggesting that the accumulation of firm-specific management know-how
by the current top executives contributes to the growth in the size of operation.
The estimated effects of the first five variables shown in column 3 as
well as the average magnitudes of the fixed effects shown in the last four
rows in column 4 on the real value of exports are qualitatively the same as
those on the real value of production. These results are consistent with the
first part of hypothesis 1—the pioneers are larger in operation size than the
followers—and with the first parts of hypotheses 2 and 3—the new pioneers
are larger than both the early and new followers. Unlike the first two columns,
the last two columns show positive and significant effects of the outsider
group, suggesting that those enterprises managed by outsiders tend to adopt
an export-oriented strategy.
Table 7 shows the estimates of the NC ratio function. Since the dependent
variable is censored at zero from below and at unity from above, the regression
model is of the two-limit Tobit model. As is well known, however, this model
is technically difficult to estimate if it is specified as a fixed-effects model.
Since a semi-parametric estimator for the fixed-effects Tobit model developed
by Bo E. Honore´ is not applicable to our small sample, we decided to estimate
the random-effects Tobit model.27 The first column presents the result of
estimation using the full sample, and the next two columns compare the first
and second halves of the period under study. Note that the estimates shown
in column 1 of table 7 are not averages of those in columns 2 and 3, partly
because the sample sizes are different and partly because some enterprises
stop and resume the export of NC machines. Qualitatively, however, the es-
timation results are similar except for the effects of the outsider dummy.
The negative and highly significant effects of the follower dummy and
the insignificant effects of the new pioneer dummy are consistent with our
hypotheses that both the original and new pioneers are faster in the adoption
of new technologies than the followers. The effect of spin-off is consistently
negative and significant, suggesting that spin-off followers had difficulty in
adopting the new technology even in the late 1990s. The positive and sig-
nificant effect of the first year of machine tool production suggests that younger
enterprises tend to have higher NC ratios. The effect of university education
on NC ratio is positive and significant throughout the decade, but it declines
in the second half. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the im-
portance of higher education in technology adoption declines as a new tech-
nology is diffused.
The outsider dummy has a positive and significant effect in the first
period, reflecting the fact that the average NC ratio of those enterprises with
this dummy equal to unity is far above the average NC ratio of the other
enterprises. The effect of this variable, however, becomes negative and sig-
nificant in the second period, reflecting the fact that three sample enterprises
lost continuity in leadership in the late 1990s and the top managers from the
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TABLE 6
Determinants of Real Value of Production and Real Value of Exports
ln(Production)
Random Effects
(1)
ln(Production)
Fixed Effects
(2)
ln(Exports)
Random Effects
(3)
ln(Exports)
Fixed Effects
(4)
Followers 2.302**
(.635)
N.A. 2.251**
(.726)
N.A.
New pioneers .005
(1.038)
N.A. 1.147
(1.169)
N.A.
New followers 3.031**
(.987)
N.A. 3.079**
(1.137)
N.A.
Spin-off .464
(.504)
N.A. .034
(.543)
N.A.
First year of machine tool production .049
(.033)
N.A. .003
(.037)
N.A.
High school .286
(.366)
.387
(.527)
.502
(.312)
.798*
(.349)
University .834*
(.424)
.600
(.518)
.434
(.342)
.115
(.368)
Outsider .180
(.495)
.168
(.662)
1.058**
(.294)
1.149**
(.296)
Years of top management .029*
(.013)
.020
(.014)
.039**
(.011)
.031**
(.011)
This content downloaded from 210.137.153.113 on January 07, 2016 23:22:49 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
121
Year dummies Two dummies for
1995, 1998
Two dummies for
1995, 1998
Nine dummies for
1991–99
Nine dummies for
1991–99
Constant 84.10
(64.84)
10.778**
(.418)
5.794
(73.03)
9.728**
(.325)
Number of observations 94 94 351 351
Number of observations per enterprise 2.3 2.3 8.2 8.2
R2:
Within .408 .416 .406 .412
Between .503 .067 .398 .045
Overall .540 .089 .401 .009
P value of Hausman test .300 N.A. .319 N.A.
P value of F-test that fixed effect p 0
for all i
N.A. .002 N.A. .001
Fixed effects:
Pioneer N.A. 1.862 N.A. 1.557
Follower N.A. .547 N.A. .615
New pioneer N.A. 2.255 N.A. 3.049
New follower N.A. .641 N.A. .858
Sources.—The data for ln(production) for random effects and fixed effects are from our own survey. The data for ln(exports) for random effects and
fixed effects are from unpublished official data on exports for Taiwan.
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N.A. p not applicable.
* Significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test).
** Significant at the 1% level (one-tailed test).
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TABLE 7
Determinants of NC Ratio
Random Effects,
Tobit
(1990–99)
(1)
Random Effects,
Tobit
(1990–94)
(2)
Random Effects,
Tobit
(1995–99)
(3)
Followers .633**
(.058)
.391**
(.837)
.519**
(.064)
New pioneers .041
(.074)
.046
(.068)
.033
(.083)
New followers .173
(.111) N.A.
.113
(.096)
Spin-off .153**
(.038)
.303**
(.040)
.127**
(.037)
First year of machine
tool production .019**
(.003)
.013**
(.003)
.014**
(.003)
High school .022
(.040)
.008
(.035)
.075
(.053)
University .196**
(.051)
.168**
(.046)
.128*
(.062)
Outsider .193**
(.055)
.319**
(.068)
.216**
(.051)
Years of top
management .005*
(.002)
.005*
(.002)
.013**
(.002)
Year dummies Nine dummies for
1991–99
Four dummies for
1991–95
Four dummies for
1996–99
Constant 36.56**
(6.431)
25.97**
(6.486)
26.94**
(6.030)
Number of
observations 345 157 188
Number of
observations
per enterprise 8.2 4.8 4.7
Number of
uncensored
observations 160 64 96
Number of left-
censored
observations 135 78 57
Number of right-
censored
observations 50 15 35
Source.—Data are from our own survey.
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N.A. p not applicable.
* Significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test).
** Significant at the 1% level (one-tailed test).
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outside reduced the NC ratios of export drastically. Finally, the years of top
management consistently has a positive and significant effect on NC ratio.
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of the unit price functions.
The first two columns compare the determinants of unit prices of conventional
machines and machining centers, using the full sample. In the latter two
columns, a comparison is made between the early and the late 1990s regarding
the unit prices of machining centers, as the pace of price changes was different
for different enterprise groups.
In column 1 of table 8, no independent variables have significant effects
on the unit prices of conventional machine tools, which suggests that the target
level of product quality does not depend on the technological and management
abilities of the enterprise in the case of conventional machine tools. In contrast,
a number of independent variables have statistically significant effects on the
unit prices of machining centers, as shown in columns 2–4. Most important,
the effects of the three group dummies are negative in all cases and highly
significant in the cases of machining centers, which is consistent with our
hypothesis 1 that the quality of the original pioneers’ products is higher than
that of the followers. As is seen from columns 3 and 4, these effects become
much smaller in absolute value terms in the later period, except for the new
followers, indicating that the original pioneers reduced unit prices more dras-
tically than the followers and the new pioneers. This is consistent with our
hypothesis 4 that the original pioneers were the most effective imitators in
the 1990s. The result that machining centers made by the new followers have
the lowest unit prices is also consistent with our previous argument that their
target market is of lower-grade machining centers. Finally, the effect of the
first year of machine tool production is generally positive, which suggests
that younger enterprises tend to produce machining centers of higher quality.
VI. Conclusion
While the importance of information spillovers in industrial growth is in-
creasingly recognized among economists, much less is known as to how they
take place. To fill the gap, this article distinguishes among the different stages
in the innovation-imitation process and among different actors. In the case of
the machine tool industry in Taiwan, the fact that many of the followers and
the new followers, and even the new pioneers, were spin-offs from the machine
tool enterprises strongly suggests the importance of spin-offs as the major
source of both innovations and imitations. Although the quantitative evidence
is hard to come by, casual observations also suggest a significant role of spin-
offs in disseminating technological knowledge and management know-how
from one enterprise to another in other industries in East Asia.
Our study indicates that the ability of followers to imitate innovation is
limited and, hence, the diversity in productivity among enterprises arises and
often persists. Whether an enterprise has low or high productivity and weak
or strong ability to imitate is not completely random or unpredictable; instead,
there seems to be a clear pattern. Even in the early stages of industrial de-
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TABLE 8
Determinants of Unit Price: Random Effects Estimates
Conventional Machine
(1990–99)
(1)
Machining Center
(1990–99)
(2)
Machining Center
(1990–94)
(3)
Machining Center
(1995–99)
(4)
Followers .172
(.239)
.467**
(.073)
.516**
(.218)
.389*
(.218)
New pioneers .185
(.404)
.503**
(.074)
.668**
(.246)
.357*
(.206)
New followers .181
(.429)
.716**
(.117)
N.A. .660*
(.338)
Spin-off .160
(.185)
.035
(.067)
.220
(.196)
.103
(.199)
First year of machine tool production .007
(.013)
.022**
(.004)
.019
(.012)
.024*
(.013)
High school .149
(.114)
.043
(.062)
.077
(.154)
.064
(.215)
University .080
(.133)
.170**
(.058)
.298
(.214)
.181
(.140)
Outsider .087
(.149)
.191**
(.070)
.349
(.276)
.037
(.092)
Years of top management .003
(.004)
.002
(.002)
.005
(.003)
.005
(.006)
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Year dummies Nine dummies for 1991–99 Nine dummies for 1991–99 Four dummies for 1991–94 Four dummies for 1996–99
Constant 7.969
(24.63)
38.40**
(7.251)
31.14
(23.26)
40.95
(25.97)
R2:
Within .121 .157 .230 .151
Between .040 .555 .566 .505
Overall .067 .560 .623 .376
P value of Hausman test .999 N.A.a .999 .267
Number of observations 288 107 43 64
Number of observations per
enterprise 8.2 5.9 3.9 4.0
Source.—Data are from our own survey.
Note.—The dependent variable is the logarithm of unit price. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. N.A. p not applicable.
a Since the variance of enterprise-specific effect was estimated to be zero, the random-effects estimator degenerated to pooled OLS and Hausman’s specification test
was not carried out.
* Significant at the 5% level (one-tailed test).
** Significant at the 1% level (one-tailed test).
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velopment, when production technology is relatively simple, the productivity
of imitators tends to be low. When more advanced technology is introduced,
new innovative and highly productive entrepreneurs may enter the industry
because new types of knowledge and ability may be required for new inno-
vations. Thereafter, another group of imitators enters the industry, and the
existing enterprises become imitators. According to the results of our study,
in this new stage of development, both old and new followers tend to be less
productive than old and new innovators.
Our study also indicates that, because of such diversity and the sequence
of changing types of entrants, the role of imitations in industrial development
changes over time. While imitation always contributes to the productivity
growth of the industry in theoretical models with homogeneous enterprises
and perfect imitation, in the real world, with significant heterogeneity of
enterprises and imperfect imitation, imitation by new entrants will make an
important contribution to the quantitative expansion of the industry and en-
hance the “collective efficiency” of industrial clusters,28 but not necessarily
to the productivity growth of the industry as a whole in the early stages of
development. The contribution of imitation to productivity growth, however,
will assume greater importance in raising the productivity in later stages when
the active entry tends to cease. Hence, it seems to us that the changing roles
of information spillovers must be carefully examined if we are to identify the
mechanism of productivity growth. Indeed, if new industries fledge one after
another in a developing economy and go through such early stages of de-
velopment, then the economy may well have high growth in GDP without
significant productivity growth, as with the “high-performing” East Asian
economies. We do not necessarily imply, however, that contribution of imi-
tation to overall economic growth is negligible, since imitators must have
shifted resources from lower value to higher value industries.
Needless to say, it is hazardous to draw strong conclusions from a single
case study. A compilation of further in-depth empirical studies in different
industries in different countries is called for in order to elucidate the roles of
innovations and imitations in the long-term process of industrial growth.
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